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PUTTING YOUR FAITH IN GOD AT THE BMV:
INDIANA'S LICENSE PLATE CONTROVERSY
Michael W Nowak*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Indiana has long boasted the honor of being the "Crossroads of America."
But if one finds themselves traveling the roads of Indiana recently, they are
likely to notice another slogan. In 2006, the Indiana Legislature passed a
resolution regarding the issuance of new license plates in the state. These new
plates proudly proclaim, "In God We Trust."2 The new license plates and their
religious slogan have ignited a controversy within the state. It is not only the
message that has come under fire, but also the way that a driver in Indiana
acquires such plates. This Note will attempt to add some clarity to this ongoing
debate. Specifically, it asks if the state of Indiana's practice of selling license
plates with the motto "In God We Trust" without an additional fee for specialty
plates violates Constitutional protections.
II.

BACKGROUND ON THE LEGISLATION

In order to analyze the legal issues implicated by the ongoing controversy
regarding Indiana's new license plates, it is imperative to have an
understanding of both the background of the specific phrase that is used and
the recent legislation that provides for these new license plates.
The phrase "In God We Trust" is the national motto of the United States of
America and should be familiar to anyone that has looked at any piece of
American currency. As such, the phrase itself has had a long history in this
country. 3 The motto first appeared on U.S. currency in 1862 as a sign that the
country was unwavering as the Civil War raged on.4 Since then, it has enjoyed
widespread use with minimal exception.5 In 1956, Congress adopted the
*

J.D., University of Notre Dame, 2009.

1. Indiana Historical Bureau, http://www.in.gov/history/2621.htm (last visited March 10,
2008).
2. Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, http://www.in.gov/bmv/3999.htm (last visited March
10, 2008).
3. Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
2083, 2122 (1996) (suggesting that the history of the phrase's beginnings are tied to that of the
National Anthem, written in 1814, during the War of 1812. A line in the final stanza states, "and
this be our motto - In God is our Trust.")
4. Id. at 2123. The motto first appeared on the half dollar as "God our Trust." In 1864, "In
God We Trust" was inscribed on two-cent coins and Congressional legislation authorized its use on
other such currency in 1865. See Act of March 3, 1865, ch.100, s 5, 13 Stat. 517, 518.
5. Id. In 1907, President Roosevelt ordered the removal of the phrase. His objection to its use
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phrase officially as the national motto and from this point its use has been
6
mandated on all forms of currency.
The question then becomes, how did this phrase make its way onto license
plates in the state of Indiana within the last year? 7 The Indiana State
Legislature created the plates through the passing of IC 9-18-24.5.8 This statute
specifically calls for the Bureau of Motor Vehicles to design an "In God We
Trust" license plate. 9 Furthermore, it lays out the procedures by which an
Indiana driver obtains such a license plate. Section 4 of the statute states:
A person who is a resident of Indiana and who is eligible to register and
display a license plate on a vehicle under this title may apply for and receive
an In God We Trust license plate for one (1) or more vehicles after December
31, 2006, after doing the following:
(1) Completing an application for an In God We Trust license plate.
10
(2) Paying the fee under section 5 of this chapter.
Section 5 of the same statute states that the license plate fee for this specific
plate is the same fee charged to those that choose the previous conventional
plate. 11 Motorists may still choose the conventional plate. It is important to
note that this fee is different than the one charged by the state for other
specialty plates. 12 Specifically, specialty plates in Indiana cost an additional $40
was not based on Constitutional grounds, but rather that it boarded on sacrilege. Congress rejected
this mandate a year later.
6. Id. Congress mandated its use on all currency in 1955. See also 36 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) (stating
"In God We Trust" is the national motto).
7. The use of specialty plates has become widespread among states over the past decade.
Indiana is not alone in facing legal challenges based on the availability and messages that they
h
display. See Planned Parenthood of South Carolina, Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (41 Cir. 2004)
(upholding South Carolina's "Choose Life" license plates).
8. IND. CODE § 9-18-24.5 (2006). The bill passed the House of Representatives by a count of 94
to 2. H.B. 1013, 114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006).
9. Within eight months of release, the Indiana House Republican Caucus stated in a press
release that the number of "In God we Trust" license plates distributed have reached over one
million in number. Rep. Woody Burton: "One Million Hoosiers Can't be Wrong!". Indiana House
Republicans, Aug. 1, 2007, availableat http://www.in.gov/legislative/house-republicans/
homepages/r58/press.html (last visited March 10, 2008).
10. IND.CODE § 9-18-24.5-4 (2006).
11. IND. CODE § 9-18-24.5-5 (2006).
12. Indiana's Bureau of Motor Vehicles Official Website, concerning specialty plates available,
states, "You'll be able to select a plate with a background from a diverse group of subjects that
includes universities, military organizations, breast cancer awareness, firefighting, nursing,
diabetes, Native Americans, arts, sports, engineering, Boy Scouts, and even Lewis and Clark."
http://www.in.gov/bmv/3722.htm# (last visited Jan. 20, 2008). According to IC § 9-18-17 to 9-1848, the various specialty plates available to drivers in Indiana include distinguishing prisoner of
war, disabled veteran, Purple Heart, Indiana National Guard, Indiana Guard Reserve, license plates
for persons with disability, amateur radio operator, civic event license plates, and special group
recognition. In addition, the state also permits specialty plates for the following groups and issues:
protecting the environment, kids first trust, education license plates, drug free Indiana trust, FFA
trust license plates, Indiana firefighter, food bank trust, girl scouts, boy scouts, retired armed forces
member, Indiana antique car museum trust, D.A.R.E. Indiana trust, Indiana arts trust, Indiana
health trust, Indiana mental health trust, Native American, Pearl Harbor survivor, Indiana state
educational institution trust, Lewis and Clark bicentennial, and Riley Children's Foundation license
plates. IND. CODE § 9-18-17-48 (2006).
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in fees. According to a BMV spokesman, $25 of this fee goes to support the
specific cause for which the plate is designed. The remaining $15 of the initial
fee is diverted into a pool earmarked for administrative costs. 13 Of this
administrative fee, $9 goes towards the BMV Commission while the remaining
14
$6 is put towards a road maintenance fund.
The legislation in question in effect waives these fees for those who choose
the "In God We Trust" plates. 15 Since the plate does not support any particular
group, the state does not collect the $25 fee as it does with other specialty plates
for their fundraising efforts. But the issue lies in the state waving the additional
fees that support administrative costs. Thus, the "In God We Trust" specialty
plates are only subject to the fees that apply to the default standard plates.
The purpose behind this legislation is not clear. The intent was not to
increase state revenues because, as stated explained above, the state actually
takes a financial loss in reducing the fees for the "In God We Trust" plates.
While legislative history on the statute in scant, comments made by the bill's

13. Lawsuit Claims "In God We Trust" Indiana License Plates Are Unconstitutional,FOXNEWS.COM,
April 24, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,268058,00.html.
14. Id. Additionally, BMV spokesman Greg Cook has stated that the "In God we Trust" plates
cost his agency $3.69 to produce while the standard plates cost the agency $3.19.
15. Indiana is not the only state that has implemented the "In God we Trust" license plate
option. North Carolina offers such plates, where the additional fees support the National Guard
Soldiers in the state. The North Carolina National Guard, http://www.nc.ngb.army.mil/NCSAAF
(last visited March 10, 2008); South Carolina offers an in "In God We Trust Plate" as well as a
secular humanist plate stating "In Reason We Trust," South Carolina Department of Motor
Vehicles, http://www.scdmvonline.com/DMVNew/plategallery.aspx?q=All (last visited March
10, 2008); Other states offering the plates include Tennessee, Tennessee Department of Revenue,
(last
http://www.tennessee.gov/revenue/vehicle/licenseplates/misc/miscdesc.htm#automobile
of
Motor
Vehicles,
Arkansas,
Department
visited
March
10,
2008);
http://www.arkansas.gov/dfa/motoryvehicle/mvplates-detail.php?pl-id=87 (last visited March
Safety,
Department
of
Public
and
Louisiana,
10,
2008);
(last visited March 10,
http://omv.dps.state.a.us/Special%20Plates/SpecialPlates-display.asp
2008). Several states offer "God Bless America" plates as well, including Alabama, Alabama
(last
Department of Revenue, http://www.revenue.alabama.gov/motorvehicle/specialty.html
of
Transportation,
2008),
Iowa,
Iowa
Department
visited
March
10,
http://www.dot.state.ia.us/mvd/ovs/plates/bless.htm (last visited March 10, 2008); Mississippi,
State Tax Commission, http://www.mstc.state.ms.us/mvl/tagjimg/Godbles.jpg (last visited
of
Revenue,
Missouri
Department
March
10,
2008);
Missouri,
http://dor.mo.gov/mvdl/motorv/plates/ (last visited March 10, 2008); Texas offers both "God
Vehicle Title and Registration Services,
Bless America" and "God Bless Texas" plates,
http://rts.texasonline.state.tx.us/NASApp/txdotrts/SpecialPlateOrderServlet?grpid=60&pltid=84
(last visited March 10, 2008); Ohio offers a plate stating "One Nation under God", Bureau of Motor
Vehicles,
https://www.oplates.com/NameLookup/PlateLookupWizardl.asp?ID=WPBLHIUPVPSYOTOUQ
OVWNMEGNCHZZXQIFQAPBPIKSAYWICPOXG (last visited March 10, 2008). Furthermore,
several legislators have proposed an "In God we Trust" option for license plates in their state, see
Jack Brammer, Panel OKs "In God We Trust" License Plate, KENTUcKY.cOM, Feb.13, 2008,
http://www.kentucky.com/454/story/316687.html (Kentucky); see also David Klepper, "In God We
Trust" and "Gold Star" License Plates Advance in Kansas Legislature, KANSASCITY.COM, Feb.22, 2008,
http://www.kansascity.com/115/story/501731.html (Kansas); see also Kartikay Mehrotra, "In
God We Trust" Coming to Illinois License Plates?, QUAD-CITY TWMES.coM, Jan. 25, 2008,
http://www.qctimes.com/articles/2008/01/25/news/local/doc47997be7c1e9a437763037.txt?sPos
=2 (Illinois); see also "In God We Trust", WKRG.coM NEWS, Dec. 25, 2007,
(Florida); see also Oklahoma State
http://www.wkrg.com/news/article/in-god.we-trust/8418/
Senate,
http://www.oksenate.gov/news/press-releases/press-releases- 2007/pr20071206a.htm
(last visited March 10, 2008) (Oklahoma). It appears that none of the fee structures employed
within these states create the same constitutional questions as the Indiana statute.
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author, State Representative Woody Burton, a republican from Greenwood,
may prove to be the most illuminating source for determining what the state
legislature was thinking when it passed this statute. In published comments,
Burton has stated that, "In this country there's a severe attack on faith. This
[the license plates] gives the public their opportunity to express their faith and
the motto of the USA, which is 'In God We Trust."1 6 Specifically regarding the
legal challenges that have been made towards IC 9-18-24.5, Burton has stated,
"It's not a special interest plate. It's a stock item. It's the motto of the country.
17
Its on the dollar bill."
As far as Representative Burton's broader views on separation of church
and state, he has written that "the constitution clearly states that we have a
freedom to worship. Separation of church and state is not even found in the
constitution. It states that the state cannot regulate religion and religion cannot
dominate government."1 8 With this background in mind, the next step in our
analysis is to address the potential legal concerns that surround IC 9-18-24.5.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

Indiana's statute establishing the option for "In God We Trust" license
plates raises a number of constitutional questions. First of all, does the enacting
of this bill violate the Establishment Clause contained within the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution? Furthermore, does this
legislation raise constitutional issues regarding the state of Indiana's privileges
and immunities clause?
In looking at this issue, it is also important to understand the legal
framework involved. This statute in question must adhere to two constitutions.
First, the statute must not violate the Federal Constitution of the United States.
While the First Amendment originally applied to only the federal government,
the Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment mandates the
states adhere to the protections contained within the Bill of Rights of the
Federal Constitution. 19 In terms of Indiana's constitution, there are a couple of
provisions that are relevant to the issues presented in this case. Specifically,
article I, sections 2-7 all concern religion. 20 Section 4 states that "No preference
shall be given, by law, to any creed, religious society, or mode of worship; and
no person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support, any place of worship,
16. Jennie Runevitch, State Unveils 'In God We Trust" License Plate, WTHR.COM, Aug. 10, 2006,
www.wthr.com/ global/story.asp?s=5266841.
17. Supra note 13. Later in the article, Burton adds "It seems unfortunate that someone that
doesn't like it would keep others from having it." In a press release, Burton stated "I am proud that
the people of Indiana are standing up for our nation's motto and choosing the 'In God We Trust'
license plate. Even though some people are challenging the word 'special' surrounding the
alternative license plate, the only thing that is truly special about this plate is that want to display
it." Supra note 9.
18. Burton Reacts to Dismissal of Prayer Lawsuit, Indiana House Republicans, Oct 31, 2007,
available at http://www.in.gov/legislative/house-republicans/homepages/r58/press.htm
(last
visited March 10, 2008).
19. Stomberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (freedom of speech); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause specifically).
20. IND. CONST. art I §§ 2-7.
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or to maintain any ministry, against his consent." 21 Furthermore, section 6
states that "No money shall be drawn from the treasury, for the benefit of any
religious or theological institution." 22 With the emphasis on not establishing a
preference by law nor contributing financially to a religious organization, these
provisions seem to address concerns similar to those covered by the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. Finally, this legislation
23
raises concerns regarding Indiana's privileges and immunities clause.
A. Does the Statute Violate the Establishment Clause?
The starting place for addressing a constitutional challenge in this case
involves an analysis of the Establishment Clause and how the courts have
interpreted its meaning. The text of the First Amendment states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
24
Government for a redress of grievances.
The First Amendment thus contains two clauses that deal with religion: the
Establishment clause and the Free Exercise Clause. In cases such as this one,
where the government seems to actively be putting forth a message, the Court
is most likely to see this case as an Establishment Clause case. In interpreting
the application of this clause, the Supreme Court has struggled over time to
devise a precise standard which lower courts can apply. As a result, three
different tests have been put forth by the Court to try to shed light on the
meaning of the clause and its application to separation of church and state
25
issues over the past five decades.
The first test that the Court employed in cases concerning the Establishment
Clause has been deemed the Lemon Test, resulting from its inception in the case
of Lemon v Kurtzman.26 This test has evolved into the Endorsement Test, which
27
the Court first put forth in Lynch v. Donnelly.
The Lemon Test was first developed in a case concerning public
subsidization of private school teachers. The Court created a three-pronged test
to determine whether the actions of the government violated the Establishment
Clause. It held that in order to withstand a constitutional challenge, the
governmental action must: 1) have a secular purpose, 2) have the primary effect
of not advancing religion, and finally 3) the action must not foster excessive

21. IND. CONST. art I § 4.
22. IND. CONsT. art I § 6.
23. IND. CONsT. art I § 23.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
25. Richard F. Suhrheinrich & T. Melindah Bush, The Ohio Motto Survives the Establishment
Clause, 64 OHO ST. L.J. 585, 587 (2003).
26. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
27. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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entanglement with religion. 28 After thirteen years of consistent use by the
Court, Justice O'Connor put a spin on the test that has transformed the Lemon
Test into its present version, the Endorsement test. 29 In her concurring opinion
in Lynch, Justice O'Connor suggested that the first two elements of the Lemon
test be viewed in the light of government endorsement. 30 In her view, the
essence of the Establishment Clause is whether the government sends a
message of endorsement so that believers of the message believe that they are
favored members of the community. 31 Therefore, she asserts that government
action is unconstitutional if it is either excessively entangled itself with religion
or takes on a more direct infringement by participating in endorsement. 32 This
view in interpreting the Establishment Clause ultimately gained acceptance by
the Court. 33 But much like its predecessor the Lemon Test, many scholars have
34
criticized the test's subjective standard.
The most recent test the Court has employed in Establishment Clause cases
has been the "Coercion" Test as stated in Lee v. Weisman. 35 Justice Kennedy
first suggested the use the Coercion Test for Establishment Clause violations in
his concurring opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU. 36 In Weisman, Kennedy
stated that "at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may
37
not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise."
Coercion consists of three elements: a forced choice, the threat of sanction, and
the presence of coercive intent. 38 Furthermore, it appears that the Court does
not deem coercion mandatory for a violation of the Establishment Clause, but it
39
has found it to be sufficient for finding that such a violation exists.
Finally, the Court has also intermittently used the "Ceremonial Deism"
Test. This test is the most relevant in the instant case. This phrase was coined
by Professor Eugene Rostow 40 and adopted by the Court in the case of Marsh v.

28. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-613; see also Epstein, supra note 3 at 2125.
29. Epstein, supra note 3 at 2125.
30. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Suhrheinrich, supra
note 25 at 588.
31. Suhrheinrich, supra note 25 at 588; see also Epstein supra note 3 at 2126.
32. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
33. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); see also Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373 (1985).
34. See Cynthia V. Ward, Coercion and Choice under the Establishment Clause, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1621, 1630 (2006) ("The basic problem with the endorsement test is that it is no test at all, but
merely a label for the judge's largely subjective impressions"). This has also been debate in the
federal court system as to how the "observer" of the alleged endorsement should be viewed. In
Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), Justice Stephens expresses his
belief that the reasonable observer should be viewed as the average American. Justice O'Connor's
view attributes more knowledge to the reasonable observer, including being "acquainted with the
text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute." Suhrheinrich, supra note 25 at 589.
35. Weisman v. Lee, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
36. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 601 (1989). See also Ward, supra note 34 at 1630.
37. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 587.
38. Ward, supra note 34 at 1639-43.
39. William J. Dobash, Coercion in the Ranks: The Establishment Clause Implications of Chaplain-Led
Prayers at Mandatory Army Events, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 1493, 1506 (2006) (Dobash adds that this test is
mostly used when the court reviews cases which involve situations such as school prayer in public
schools).
40. Suhrheinrich, supra note 25 at n.7; see also Epstein, supra note 3 at 2091("Rostow reconciled
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Chambers.41 The concept behind ceremonial deism stems from tradition. The
argument is that the use of religion, in nondenominational terms, is needed to
be used by the government in some very limited situations were solemnity
needs to be created and only invoking God in those specific situations will
suffice in creating this necessary mood. 42 Included in this doctrine is the idea
that such invocations of God in these limitations situations over time has
prompted a ceremonial deism - that meaning once contained within these
invocations has lost its religious nature. 43 As such, there is no real religious
issue at stake. Justice Brennan in his concurrence in Abington Township v.
Schempp, addressing the phrase at issue in this case, stated that be believed that
the national motto has reached this level of ceremonial deism - that it has been
so entrenched into the country's traditions that it has lost its specific religious
meaning. 44 Specifically, in Marsh the Court stated that "to invoke divine
guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws is not, in these
circumstances, a violation of the Establishment Clause; it is simply a tolerable
45
acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country."
Given the previous tests that the Court has used in its Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, it is unlikely that any court will find Indiana's license
plate statute unconstitutional on the grounds that it establishes a religious
belief. Its use, as described by Justice Brennan, seems to fall directly under the
ceremonial deism as previously described. Under Marsh's test for ceremonial
deism, the phrase "In God We Trust" has reached the point that it has become
common place and is not viewed by the majority of the populace as an
affirmation of belief in a higher religious being. Therefore, its mere presence on
state-issued license plates would not violate the Establishment Clause if the
Court adopts the Ceremonial Deism Test in this case.
Furthermore, it does not appear as though a challenge would be successful

the Establishment Clause with a class of public activity, which ...could be accepted as so
conventional and uncontroversial as to be constitutional."). See also Arthur E. Sutherland, Book
Review, 40 IND. L.J. 83, 86 (1964) (reviewing Wilber G. Katz, Religion and American Constitutions
(1963)).
41. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
42. Epstein, supra note 3 at 2092; see also County of Allegheny, 492 U.S at 596 n.46 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
43. Id.
44. School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203, 303 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
The phrase "In God We Trust" was not specifically at issue in the case, so his statements concerning
the national motto are to be considered dicta, however influential. Other Supreme Court opinions
have also stated in dicta a likelihood of upholding the use of the national motto at least in certain
contexts, see County of Allegany, 492 U.S. at 602-3 ("Our previous opinions have considered in dicta
the motto ...characterizing [it] as consistent with the proposition that government may not
communicate an endorsement of religious belief."); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)("Government's display of the creche in this particular physical setting [is] no more an
endorsement of religion than such governmental 'acknowledgments' of religion as ...
[the] printing
of 'In God We Trust' on coins...."). See also, Epstein supra note 3 at 2093 (examples of ceremonial
deism prevalent in the United States include legislative prayers and prayer rooms, prayers and the
invocation of God at presidential inaugurations, invocation of "God save the United States and this
Honorable Court" prior to judicial proceedings, administration of oaths, use of A.D and "in the year
of Our Lord" in public documents, the National Day of Prayer, Thanksgiving and Christmas as
public holidays, and the use of "under God" in the pledge of allegiance.)
45. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
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under the other tests that the Court has pronounced either. In terms of a
Coercion Test analysis, the state specifically allows for another message-neutral
plate to be selected at the option of the car owner. Therefore, there is no
mandate by the state that each individual driver must display the phrase at
issue. While the intent of the legislature in passing this legislation is
questionable, no forced choice or threat of sanction is present which would lead
the Court to invalidate this statute under the Coercion Test.
Shifting to a Lemon/Endorsement Test analysis, a more difficult case has to
be made for this legislation to withstand a constitutional challenge. But,
because of the jurisprudence of the Court has been infused with the ideal of
ceremonial deism, the use of this test in the instant case does not ultimately
change the result. Under the first element of the traditional Lemon Test, 46 the
state could claim that it has a secular purpose in giving the "In God We Trust"
option to motorists. Much like a ceremonial deism argument, 47 the state can
claim that the message works to create solemnity on the roadways and
promotes responsible driving by its citizenry as a result. Surely the state has an
interest in promoting highway safety. Moving to the second element, it can be
argued that the option for these new license plates does not promote any
religion. Once again, citing back to the all important ceremonial deism that the
Court has pronounced, a religious message is not being primarily promoted
because the phrase has lost all of its religious meaning over time. Finally,
because the message does not promote any specific religious doctrine or faith
(except that perhaps a God does in fact exist) this does not reach the level of
entanglement. There is no evidence that church leaders were officially
consulted as to the specifics of the message, nor do the plates create any lasting
ties between religion and the government once the motorist leaves the BMV.
While still on the road, at this point the relationship between the government
and the specific message has ended. 48 Incorporating the Endorsement Test into
this analysis, a reasonable observer (informed with the history the phrase has in
American and the Court's previous statements concerning ceremonial deism in
the past) would conclude that the state was not endorsing any religion by the
use of the phrase. Even the reasonable observer who has not reached the level
of knowledge that O'Connor believes that standard entails, 49 will be likely to
conclude that the message is so broad and watered down that it does not reach
the level of religious endorsement by the state.
Due to the movement and alternating standards that the Supreme Court

46. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
47. Esptein, supra note 3 at 2092.
48. Alternatively, the argument could be made that the continued use of the plates by the
motorists in the state in fact maintains a relationship. For example, motorists from other states will
have occasion to see these official plates. One can argue that the motorists might receive this as an
outward display that the state of Indiana endorses a belief in God. But ultimately, the phrase at
issue does not create this problem. While this might be the case with other religious messages, "In
God We Trust" is the national motto, familiar with many from all states. They would not see this as
endorsement under O'Connor's test. Furthermore, the relationship ends for entanglement purposes
since the state no longer makes decisions as to what the plate will say after the motorist leaves the
BMV.
49. See supra note 34.
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has taken in Establishment Clause cases over the past three decades, numerous
circuit courts have been forced to clarify the law in this area as well. In regards
to the specific phrase pertinent in this case, lower courts have had the
opportunity to weigh in and have found the phrase itself to pass constitutional
standards. 50 This attention has not only focused on the national motto, but
rather has taken on similar phrases and uses throughout the county as well.
For example, the Sixth Circuit has recently upheld the phrase "With God All
Things Are Possible" as Ohio's state motto. 51 On the other hand, the Ninth
Circuit declared that the phase "under God" as recited in the Pledge of
Allegiance in public schools was unconstitutional. 52 There are countless other
53
examples of similar uses that may be the subject of litigation in the future.
This trend could even spill over to challenges against license plates from other
states as well, for many states allow for religious-type messages to be
displayed, albeit not on a no-fee basis that ultimately dooms the Indiana statute
54
in question.
Having addressed the federal questions, the analysis then shifts to whether
this legislation has violated the Indiana Constitution's provisions on religion.
First of all, in regards to section 4, the state cannot give preference to any
religion. While the bounds of Indiana's Establishment Clause are not clear, it
50. See Lambeth v. Bd. Of Comm'rs, 407 F.3d 266, 272 (4th. Cir. 2005) (the court, in upholding
motion to dismiss, states, "the Complaint alleges no circumstances-such as an inappropriate context
or character-to negate the legitimate secular connotations arising from the long-standing patriotic
uses in this country of the phrase 'In God We Trust.' A reasonable observer contemplating the
inscription of the phrase on the Government Center would recognize it as recently installed, but
also as incorporating familiar words-a phrase with religious overtones, to be sure, but also one
long-used, with all its accompanying secular and patriotic connotations as our national motto and
currency inscription."; see also Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 2005) (court upheld
display of ten commandments at county administration building, finding it did not give the
appearance of endorsing religion since it was surrounded by other secular texts, such as the
Declaration of Independence. The court found that the purpose was educational. Important for the
purposes of this Note is the fact that the national motto "In God We Trust" was part of this display,
its use was not challenged, and that the court characterized it with the other secular texts); see also
O'Hair v. Murray, 588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1979) (affirming dismissal of challenge to "In God We
Trust" as national motto and its use on currency).
51. Suhrheinrich, supra note 25 at 586; American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio v. Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (finding the motto appropriate under
ceremonial deism and Endorsement Test); see also 20 F.Supp.2d 1176 (S.D. Ohio 1998); cf. 210 F.3d
703 (6th Cir. 2002) (disagreeing with the en banc opinion). Even the dissent by Judge Merritt in the
en banc opinion distinguishes Ohio's phrase from the national motto stating, "While the phrase In
God We Trust refers broadly to a shared human yearning for the spiritual, the Ohio motto conveys
a sectarian view of God as interventionist, active and omnipotent. The national motto does not
specify a personal, all-knowing, God who makes all things possible by intervening in daily affairs.
The God in whom we trust could be the god of Jefferson's deism or even the laws of science or the
cosmology of Newton or Einstein. It does not define the god of any religion. The god of the silver
coin and the dollar bill - In Whom We Trust - may be drawn from any of the gods of the world's
vast pantheon of divinity that has accumulated from Greek times to the present." Capitol Square,
243 F.3d at 315 (Merritt dissenting); see also Suhrheinrich, supra note 25 at 600.
52. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002). The merits of this decision were
criticized by Congress, see H.R.Res.459, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REC. H4130 (daily ed. June 28,
2002). Congress also responded by proposing a Constitutional Amendment to protect both the
Pledge of Allegiance and the National Motto, H.R.J. Res. 108, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REC. H5790
(daily ed. July 25, 2002 pt. II). The Supreme Court later reversed the 9th Circuit's decision on a
standing issue. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
53. For examples, see supra note 44.
54. For examples, see supra note 15.
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appears that the analysis that governs the federal religion clauses is appropriate
here as well. The Indiana Supreme Court has paid lip service to the unique
nature of Indiana's Establishment Clauses in comparison to its federal
counterpart, but in practice has yet to adopt any test for such claims. 55 Even if
the court relies solely on a historical and textual analysis of the state's
constitutional religion clauses, as it seemed to do in City Chapel v. South Bend,
the phrase at issue in this case will be upheld. 56 Given the history of general
acceptance that the phase has enjoyed and the fact that section 2 of the state's
own constitution proclaims "All people shall be secured in the natural right to
worship ALMIGHTY GOD, according to the dictates of their own consciences,"
it would be difficult to prohibit the use of the phrase "In God We Trust" in this
case. 57 Thus the court, by applying either the federal test or a historical
analysis, is likely to determine that the use of the national motto in this case
does not give preference to any specific religion and therefore this legislation
does not violate the state constitutional provision prohibiting the establishment
of religion. Furthermore, in terms of Section 6's restriction on the state's
financial contributions to religious organizations, IC 9-18 -24.5 does not call for
any funds from the state's treasury to actually go to any organization outside of
government. As stated above, the state does not collect the $25 fee for these
plates earmarked for the charitable organization as it does for the other
specialty plates.
Therefore this statute does not violate the Indiana's
Constitution version of the establishment clause and its provision banning
financial support to be given by the government towards any religious
organization.
B. Does the Indiana Statute Violate Privileges and Immunities Clause?
While it appears unlikely that the courts will find statue IC 9-18-24.5
unconstitutional on Establishment Clause grounds, the statute does raise
additional constitutional concerns. Specially, there have been claims that the
practice violates article 1, section 23 of the Indiana Constitution. This section of
the state's constitution states, "The General Assembly shall not grant to any
citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same
terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." 5 8 Indiana's privileges and

55. See City Chapel Evangelical Free, Inc. v. City of South Bend ex rel. Dept. of Redevelopment,
744 N.E.2d 443, 446 (Ind.2001) ("the religious liberty provisions of the Indiana Constitution were
not intended merely to mirror the federal First Amendment. We reject the contention that the
Indiana Constitution's guarantees of religious protection should be equated with those of its federal
counterpart and that federal jurisprudence therefore governs the interpretation of our state
guarantees."); But see Myers v. State, 714 N.E.2d 276, 280-81 (Ind.Ct. App. 1999) (Court does not
confront state constitutional issues and employs Lemon Test to federal Establishment Clause
question). The lack of case law on Indiana's religion clauses seems to imply that both the parties to
such cases and the courts that have heard them did not think the state clauses were at issue in light
of the scrutiny applied to the federal question. A possible explanation to this phenomenon is that
the analysis of the federal question is more exacting - thus if a state practice is found to pass federal
constitutional muster, it would implicitly be valid under state constitutional law as well.
56. City Chapel, 744 N.E.2d at 447.
57. IND. CONST. art. I, § 2 (emphasis in original).
58. IND. CONST. art. I, § 23.
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immunities clause differs from the Federal Constitution's clause of the same
name. 59 The purpose of the state's clause is "to prevent the distribution of
extraordinary benefits or burdens to any group." 60 As such, the legal analysis
under Indiana's clause is to be done independently of what the U.S. Supreme
Court has said on the Federal Constitution's version of the clause. 61 Indiana's
courts, when presented with a privileges and immunities clause challenges,
undertake a two part test to determine the claim's validity. The first step of the
analysis mandates that the "disparate treatment accorded by the legislation
must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish
unequally treated classes." 62
Furthermore, courts have held that this
"preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to
all persons similarly situated." 63 As the court summed up in Horn:
Under the privileges and immunities clause, the statutory distinctions must
improve something more than mere characteristics which will serve to divide
or identify a class; there must be inherent differences in situation related to
the subject matter of the legislation which require, necessitate, or make
expedient different or exclusive legislation with respect to the members of the
class.64

Article 1, section 23 is the basis for a lawsuit filed in Indiana State Court
earlier this year. In the pending case, Studler v. Indiana Bureau of Motor
Vehicles, 65 the ACLU's main argument for the plaintiff is "those who obtain the
'In God We Trust' plate are afforded the opportunity to make an affirmative
statement at no cost," 66 while the plaintiff incurred additional cost to make his
statement regarding his support for the environment by opting for the
"environment" plates. 67
This argument, unlike a challenge under the

59. Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution states that "the Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S.
CONST. art. IV, §2. Indiana's clause also differs from the Privileges and Immunities Clause
contained within the 14 th amendment of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
60. Smith v. Indiana Dept. of Corr., 821 N.E.2d 975, 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); see also W.C.B. v.
State, 855 N.E.2d 1057 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); see generally 5A Ind. Law Encycl. Constitutional Law §
147 (2008).
61. Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind. 1994); see generally 5A Ind. Law Encycl. Constitutional
Law § 147.
62. Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 80.
63. Id.; see also Rondon v. State, 711 N.E.2d 506, 513 (Ind. 1999). The baseline for a challenge
under the state's privileges and immunities clause is unequal treatment. Hosler ex rel. Hosler v.
Catepillar, Inc., 710 N.E.2d 193, 198 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). This analysis differs from the standards
that the Supreme Court has established for the Privileges and Immunities Clause under the Federal
Constitution. The purpose of the federal clause is to prevent discrimination on the basis of state
residency, which is not at issue in this case. See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 316 (15 th ed. 2004). Furthermore, Indiana courts do not employ
different levels of scrutiny as federal courts do. John Laramore, Indiana ConstitutionalDevelopments,
37 IND. L. REV. 929, 945 (2004).
64. Horn v. Hendrickson, 824 N.E. 2d 690, 702 (Ind. App. 2005).
65. Studler v. Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Complaint, available at http://www.acluin.org/upload/newsletters/LicensePlateComplaint.pdf
66. Id.
67. Id.
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Establishment Clause, is not centered on the religious message contained on the
license plates. In all likelihood, the argument would be the same no matter
what the message on the plate stated. But even so, the fact that the Establish
Clause looms makes it even more difficult for this statue to pass constitutional
muster.
There are several reasons that support Studler's argument that Indiana's
practices under IC 9-18-24.5 violate the state's privileges and immunities clause.
Specifically on this point, Studler argues that the statute in question "represents
disparate treatment that is not reasonably related to the inherent characteristics
which distinguish the unequally treated class and preferred treatment is not
68
uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated."
This claim strikes at the heart of the clause. First of all, this case deals with
the actions of the state legislature in enacting the legislation at issue, in addition
to the actions of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles in its execution of the statute
amounts to state action. The claim then falls under the mandate of Lutz, which
requires that a state action by involved in order for a plaintiff to bring a claim
under the privileges and immunities clause. 69 Further, the burden is on Studler
to negate "every reasonable basis" for the classification between the favored
group (those who want the statement "In God We Trust" on their license plates)
and the disadvantaged group (those who wish to make other statements on
their license plates). 70 Studler also has to overcome the deference that courts
71
give to the legislature in making such class determinations.
Therefore the main question that needs to be addressed is whether there is
any reasonable basis for the legislation's classification between the two groups.
But this "reasonable basis" standard cannot be looked at in a vacuum. For
example, when looking at the plain language of the phrase, the most obvious
basis for this classification would be to promote a trust in God within the state.
The legislation can be said to achieve this by giving an incentive to those
drivers who choose to display the "In God We Trust" license plate over other
specialty plates. This incentive of paying less in fees then at least makes the

68. Id.
69. Lutz v. Fortune, 758 N.E.2d 77, 84 (Ind.Ct. App. 2001); see generally 5A Ind. Law Encycl.
Constitutional Law § 147 (2008); state action includes actions by governmental agencies, see Palin v.
Indiana State Personnel Dept., 698 N.E.2d 347, 354 (Ind.Ct. App. 1998).
70. Leadbetter v. Hunter, 842 N.E.2d 810, 813 (Ind.2006); see also Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp.,
Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 597 (1980) (holding that the plaintiff's burden is "to negate every conceivable
basis which might have supported the classification").
71. W.C.B., 855 N.E.2d at 1060. Discretion of the courts to overturn a statute is limited to laws
deemed arbitrary and "manifestly unreasonable." Ziegler v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 797
N.E.2d 881 (Ind.Tax 2003); Flemming v. Int'l Pizza Supply Corp., 707 N.E.2d 1033, (Ind.App. 1999);
Chamberlain v. Parks, 692 N.E.2d 1380, 1382 (Ind. App. 1998). Case law has shown that this
deference has been difficult to overcome. See generally 5A Ind. Law Encycl. Constitutional Law §
157 (2008); see also Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Carlberg by Carlberg, 694 N.E. 2d 222
(Ind. 1997) (transfer students versus other students in determining athletic eligibility); American
Legion Post No. 113 v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (drawing distinction between
riverboat/lottery gambling and other forms); Carr v. State, 93 N.E. 1071 (Ind. 1911) (taking into
account police powers of the state in upholding excepted classes to Sunday laws); see also Palin, 698
N.E.2d at 354 (upholding different classification between professional personnel and executive
personnel in state pay scales for the purpose of recruiting and retaining those with technical
knowledge to the job).
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plate in question equal to the default, standard-issue license plate. Thus, the
legislation has shown a reasonable basis for the classification within the statute.
But we simply cannot look at this statute without factoring in the Establishment
Clause. When looking at this "reasonable basis" standard, coupled with the
U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the Establishment clause, the
mandate then becomes in order for IC 9-18-24.5 to be constitutional under both
clauses, the "reasonable basis" for the legislation cannot be the promotion of
religion. If the purpose of the classification is to promote a trust in God, then
the legislation is doomed. Its basis, no matter how reasonable, is forbidden
under the Establishment Clause. A statute cannot have a reasonable basis
under the law if that underlying basis is unconstitutional; and it is unreasonable
to create a law in direct violation of a constitutional provision. 72 This then
transforms the analysis. The question then becomes, is there any reasonable
basis for this classification besides the promotion of religion by the state? 73
The state legislature has put this legislation in a bind. What is the
reasonable basis for distinguishing those like Studler who want to promote
causes like the environmental protection and those who want to promote a trust
in God? Unfortunately, legislative history does not provide any guidance on
this question. By reading Representative Burton's comments in the previous
section, 74 the ability to express one's faith is the purpose behind the statute.
Once again, this does not help the state's case. The state cannot even argue that
they have a revenue raising purpose in enacting the legislation - as stated
earlier, the state actually takes a financial hit on the "In God We Trust" plates in
that it is not maximizing profits from the sale of specialty plates. 75 Thus, there
does not seem to be a reasonable basis to differentiate the ability to express
one's faith "In God We Trust" over one's faith in (or concern for) the
environment.
The state's only realistic argument to withstand the pitfalls of the privileges
and immunities clause in light of the restrictions brought to bear by the
Establishment Clause would be to combine an argument of ceremonial deism
while using the differences in fee structure to its advantage. First of all the state
could try to save this legislation by arguing that the phrase "In God We Trust"
no longer has any religious significance, but rather is used to create solemnity
in a way that only ceremonial deism can provide. This is reasonable because,
the state could argue, it has an interest in maintaining safe roadways and that
76
drivers are less likely to drive recklessly with this type of solemnity in mind.
Therefore the promotion of safe driving is inherently different than the
messages that the other various specialty plates promote. Thus, the state is not

72. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 178 (1803) ("The Constitution is superior to any
ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to
which they both must apply").
73. In order to determine whether the government action is "promoting religion," refer back to
the discussion concerning the Endorsement Test, Coercion Test and ceremonial deism, supra pp. 710.
74. See supra note 13.
75. See supra note 14.
76. See supra note 44.
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promoting religion, while at the same time providing a reasonable basis for
making this class determination. Additionally, the state should argue that the
fact that there are no special proceeds going to any one group (i.e. the $25 of the
fees for other specialty plates) makes the "In God We Trust" plates inherently
different from other specialty plates. Thus this rationale provides the needed
"reasonable basis" for the differing classifications by the legislature. If the court
accepts this argument, then the purpose is separate from the promotion of
religion. This, coupled with the Supreme Court's trend to tolerate the national
motto for Establishment Clause purposes, would mean that the statute would
likely be upheld. Both of these arguments are also uniformly applicable
because whoever wants to select the plate is afforded the same specialty plate
fee waiver. Therefore, the second prong of Indiana's privileges and immunities
clause analysis is not at issue.
But ultimately, these arguments try too hard. Despite judicial deference to
the decisions of legislators in such class distinctions, this particular legislation is
just too flawed. The clear purpose of the legislation in question is to promote a
trust in a religious being. To say that the fees are collected differently does not
account for the entire issue. Even if the $25 dollars is no longer an issue, there
still is the matter of the additional $15 discrepancy. To waive it only for the "In
God We Trust" plates and not for the other group of specialty plate holders
solely on the basis of the $25 fundraising fee cannot be thought of as a
"reasonable basis." This is a created, not an inherent characteristic. In the end,
77
the legislation in question raises too many issues to withstand this challenge.
Indiana's "In God We Trust" license plate legislation is unconstitutional due to
its lack of reasonable basis for its fees classification. As such, it violates the
state's privileges and immunities clause. Even if this statute passes the
privileges and immunities clause challenge, its rationale for doing so would put
it in danger of an Establishment Clause challenge.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite no constitutional problems with the government's use of the phrase
"In God we Trust" in of itself, the fact that Indiana's IC 9-18-24.5 promotes
these license plates over other specialty plates violates Indiana's Constitution
article 1, section 23. As this Note has explained, the Supreme Court has hinted
that the national motto would survive a challenge under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution. Even an independent
analysis of the phrase's use on license plates based on the various tests that the
Court has employed in addressing these types of issues lends itself to
77. Another effect of this legislation concerns the potential for abuse regarding the police
powers of the state. The question in this specific case, and in many ways all cases where specialty
plates are promoting a message, is whether this will make those displaying the plates a target for
discrimination? Or conversely, will the displaying of the message lead to undue favoritism? This is
particularly relevant question to ask in light of recent debate on racial profiling by police and
security personnel across the country. The question must then be asked, does the option for "In
God We Trust" plates create a possibility of discrimination that outweighs any potential benefits
that this legislation might have?
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upholding the constitutionality of the plates. But while not unconstitutional
under the Endorsement Clause, Indiana's statute allowing for "In God We
Trust" license plates does violate Indiana's constitutional protection against
granting unequal privileges and immunities to its citizens. This conclusion
stems not from the actual content of the message that the state has decided to
promote, but rather that it promoted any message at all to the detriment of
others without a reasonable basis for doing so. Any reasonable basis that the
state can conjure up will likely result in the state admitting that it violated the
Establishment Cause in doing so. As a result, the legislation is unlikely to
withstand the challenge being waged against in it in court on this basis.
Of course, this is not to say by any means that the promotion of religion or
the ability to show your support of religion on your license plates is an
inherently bad concept. It is completely reasonable to believe that the
promotion of faith, as Representative Burton believes that this law does, 78
promotes the common good of society to its benefit. This legislation just fails to
do it the proper, constitutional way. By creating a discrepancy between the fees
paid for the "In God We Trust" license plate and other specialty plates, IC 9-1824.5 violates the state's privileges and immunities clause. As such, the
legislature would be justified in amending the statute to eliminate the different
classifications of specialty plates and the fees that accompany them. The
drivers of Indiana should still be able to show their faith by proudly displaying
their "In God We Trust" plates - they just should have to cough up the extra
fifteen dollars like everyone else.

78. See supra note 13.

